Arrow interceptor costs are less certain as Israel isn’t transparent with its procurement data. However, reporting indicates that each Arrow-3 interceptor costs around $4 million.30 Based on the 34 verified interceptors used, that adds up to around $136 million — but if the larger, 131 interceptor number is correct, then the Arrow-3 cost could have been as high as $524 million. As for Arrow-2, reporting indicated that at the time the missile was unveiled in 2000, it cost $827,000, just over $1.5 million in 2025 dollars.31 These numbers suggest the nine Arrow-2s verified to have been used during the war cost over $13 million.
There are a few ways to add this up. Using only the interceptors verified in Abbadi’s videos, the cost was $644.5 million. Raising the number of THAAD interceptors to 150 brings the cost to $2.054 billion. Adding SM-3s introduces variance but brings the total to between $2.694 billion and $4.294 billion. Finally, shifting to the high, but lowconfidence estimate of Arrow-3 expenditure
produces a final, high-end estimate of $3.082 billion to $4.682 billion. A reasonable estimate that includes 150 THAADs and 80 SM-3s ranges from $2.694 billion to $4.682 billion, depending on which SM-3 variant was used and how many Arrow-3s were used. By comparison, the Trump administration judged Operation Rough Rider, the air campaign against the Houthis, to be too expensive, ending the campaign after spending over $1 billion on more than 1,000 airstrikes in 70 waves.32
Beyond the high cost, the war raised questions about American interceptor stockpiles and production rates for US missiles and their Israeli equivalents. While the exact size of the THAAD stockpile is unclear, the United States has procured about 650 since 2010.33 As some of those procured interceptors would have been fired against the Houthis and during tests, it seems safe to say about a quarter of procured THAAD interceptors were fired during the war. Only 37 THAAD interceptors will be procured in
30 Yossi Yehoshua, “Israel signs multi-billion deal to buy more Arrow-3 interceptors to counter Houthi threat,” Ynet, December 24, 2024, https://www.ynetnews.com/article/rj94ruubyg.
31 Judah Ari Gross and TOI Staff, “Israel, US test upgraded Arrow 2 missile, capable of intercepting incoming nukes,” Times of Israel, August 13, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-us-successfully-test-arrow-2-missile-defense-system/.
32 Courtney Kube and Gordon Lubold, “Trump operation against Houthis cost more than $1 billion,” NBC News, May 8, 2025, https:// www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/trump-operation-houthis-cost-1-billion-rcna205333; Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “US bombing dents but doesn’t destroy Houthi threat in Yemen,” Reuters, May 7, 2025, http://reuters.com/world/us-bombing-dents-doesntdestroy-houthi-threat-yemen-2025-05-07/.
33 Shelby Holliday, Anat Peled, and Drew FitzGerald, “Israel’s 12-Day War Revealed Alarming Gap in America’s Missile Stockpile.”
FY26.34 Of course, THAAD production has fluctuated from over 100 interceptors in 2019 to 11 in 2024, yet the expenditure rate in the June 2025 conflict exceeds even the most aggressive production rate by 50 percent.35 The United States blew through several years of production and around a quarter of its stockpile of THAAD interceptors in less than two weeks of combat.
A similar story is told by the SM-3 numbers. The United States had received 470 SM-3 interceptors by the end of 2024.36 The stockpile would be smaller as some would have been retired due to age and others used during tests or engagements with Iran and the Houthis. The 80 interceptors used during the war therefore represent 17 percent of all SM3s ever delivered and a higher share, likely between a quarter and a third, of the existing stockpile.37
The SM-3 procurement plan is even leaner than that of THAAD. Since FY24 the US has only procured 12 SM-3 IIAs each year, with 55 additional IBs to be delivered by 2031.38 As it takes a few years for procured interceptors to be delivered, 71 interceptors will be delivered in 2025 and another 66 in 2026.39 But, given the decline in procurement numbers, 2025 will likely be the crest of the interceptor wave. Eventually only 12 SM-3s IIAs will be delivered each year.
The 12 Day War expenditure exceeded the largest annual delivery of SM-3 IIAs.
The Israelis do not share data on Arrow procurement or stockpiles, but US officials indicated that by the end of the war Israel was running low on anti-ballistic missiles, husbanding its interceptors.40 Despite the lack of clarity from the Israelis the broader trend is clear. Defending against roughly 500 Iranian missiles nearly depleted Israeli interceptor stocks and consumed around a quarter of the stockpile and several years’ worth of production of two of the most sophisticated US missile defense systems.
Implications
What does the June 2025 conflict suggest about air and missile defenses in future wars? The Iranian air defense experience shows the importance of basing mode design. The missile city concept failed without proper early dispersal of missiles and launchers. Poor air defenses meant that while the tunnels themselves were safe, the TELs were either bottled up inside, unable to leave as entrances were sealed, or hit on the move. This predicament diminished the size and coordination of Iranian retaliatory strikes, undermining their ability to coerce Israel into ending the conflict earlier.
34 Missile Defense Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates,” 88.
35 Wes Rumbaugh, “The United States Is Set to Buy More THAAD Interceptors. Is It Enough?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 16, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-set-buy-more-thaad-interceptors-it-enough.
36 Wes Rumbaugh, “Did the US Defense of Israel from Missile Attacks Meaningfully Deplete Its Interceptor Inventory?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 4, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/did-us-defense-israel-missile-attacks-meaningfully-deplete-its-interceptor-inventory.
37 According to Missile Defense Agency budget documents, it appears that 71 SM-3 Block IA interceptors were procured. Those have since been removed from the stockpile. Between those and the 12 SM-3 IBs used during True Promise I, that brings the potential SM-3 stockpile down to about 387 interceptors. Many of those have been used in tests and in defending against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, though the exact number is unknown. See: Missile Defense Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates,” 118.
38 Wes Rumbaugh, “Did the US Defense of Israel from Missile Attacks Meaningfully Deplete Its Interceptor Inventory?”; Missile Defense Agency, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 Budget Estimates,” 150; “Contracts For May 16, 2025,” US Department of Defense, May 16, 2025, https://www.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract/Article/4189244/.
39 Wes Rumbaugh, “Did the US Defense of Israel from Missile Attacks Meaningfully Deplete Its Interceptor Inventory?”
40 Shelby Holliday, “Israel Is Running Low on Defensive Interceptors, Official Says,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2025, https://www. wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-is-running-low-on-defensive-interceptors-official-says-fd64163d.
A common observation since the war is that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un must be pleased with his completed nuclear deterrent given what happened to the hedging Iranians.41 While undoubtedly true, the June 2025 conflict may have created no small amount of unease amongst the North Koreans as well. Though they possess a functioning nuclear deterrent, North Korea’s air defenses are as bad if not worse than Iran’s. Similar to Iran, North Korea has put much more emphasis on its pursuit of an offensive missile force at the expense of air defenses, though this has changed slightly for North Korea in recent years.42 The North Koreans probably also rely on Russia for modern SAMs given the recent appearance of a Pantsir system on a North Korean naval vessel.43
In a conflict against American and South Korean forces, North Korea’s air defenses will confront a more formidable challenge than Iran’s, particularly given the mountainous geography of North Korea that complicates detection of low-flying aircraft. As the Iranians demonstrated, waiting out allied strikes in North Korea’s underground missile bases deep in the mountains is not a winning strategy. Given the challenge of air defense and the lessons from the Iranian missile cities, the North Koreans could easily conclude they need to disperse
their forces from their underground bases early in a crisis and ensure they are the first to fire should a war start. North Korea was already pursuing a strategy along those lines given their production and deployment of hundreds of mobile launchers and pursuit of early warning systems like airborne radars and reconnaissance satellites.44 However, observing the outcome of the June 2025 conflict has probably entrenched the North Koreans in a forward-leaning posture prone to rapid escalation.
The Israeli and US missile defense experience illustrates how brutal high-intensity regional conflict will be for interceptor magazines. Given the expenditure rates discussed earlier, the 12-Day War raises serious questions about the ability of US and allied forces to defend against the more sophisticated and deeper regional ballistic missile arsenals of China and North Korea. The war suggests defending bases like Guam within the Second Island Chain from China’s missile forces will be extremely challenging. According to the most recent China Military Power Report, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force fields 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) on 250 launchers capable of targeting Guam, a similar number of missiles as Iran fired during the war but undoubtedly more sophisticated.45 Defending against that force
41 Vipin Narang and Panay Vaddi, “The North Korean Way of Nuclear Proliferation,” Foreign Affairs, September 5, 2025, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/north-korea/north-korean-way-proliferation; Dasl Yoon and Timothy W. Martin, “US Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Program Risks Emboldening North Korea’s Kim,” Wall Street Journal, June 26, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-attack-on-irans-nuclear-program-risks-emboldening-north-koreas-kim-d62402f3.
42 Tianran Xu, “Developments of North Korea’s Land-based Air Defense Systems,” 38 North, July 19, 2024, https://www.38north. org/2024/07/developments-of-north-koreas-land-based-air-defense-systems/; “DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Firing of New Air Defence Missiles,” Korean Central News Agency, August 24, 2025, http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/b0788b8e8fcc3bea82219984e45acce0.kcmsf.
43 Anton Sokolin, “Russia gave North Korea advanced air defenses over Ukraine war support: Report,” NK News, May 30, 2025, https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/russia-gave-north-korea-advanced-air-defenses-over-ukraine-war-support-report/; “South Korea official says Russia provided anti-air missile to North Korea,” Reuters, November 21, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/south-koreaofficial-says-russia-provided-anti-air-missile-north-korea-yonhap-2024-11-22/.
44 Colin Zwirko, “North Korea says it deployed nuclear-capable missiles to South Korean border,” NK News, August 5, 2024, https:// www.nknews.org/2024/08/north-korea-hands-over-250-tactical-missile-systems-to-units-on-rok-border/; Decker Eveleth, “This Technology Could Be a Game-Changer for North Korea,” Foreign Policy, May 19, 2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/19/north-korea-missile-aircraft-radar-surveillance-technology/.
45 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual Report to Congress,” US Department of Defense, December 18, 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF (accessed August 21, 2025), 66.
would likely demand even more interceptors than were used during the 12 Day War, due to the more advanced nature of the Chinese missile threat and the difficulty of replicating the Israeli missile defeat strategy in the IndoPacific context. The Guam missile defense system currently under construction is certainly inadequate to deal with the current and future Chinese IRBM problem. The active defense challenge only gets worse for bases closer to the Chinese mainland as the more numerous Chinese medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force comes into play.46
However, the results of True Promise II against Nevatim suggest passive defenses like aircraft dispersal, aircraft shelters, and building additional runways and takeoff-capable taxiways may be effective countermeasures to long-range conventional missile attacks. Despite absorbing 32 MRBMs, including a direct hit to a hardened F-35I shelter, no aircraft were damaged and only a handful of hangers were damaged or destroyed at Nevatim.47 These passive measures can help keep an airbase in the fight longer, for less cost, than active defenses.
The same lessons regarding the utility of passive defenses and the problems of defeating massed missile attacks are even more pertinent in the Korean context. The shorter flight times and large number of North Korean short range ballistic missiles may pose an insurmountable challenge to active defenses like THAAD or PAC-3. The delivery of 250 TELs for carrying 1000 Hwasong11D SRBMs to the KPA in 2024 suggests the scope of the problem and the vast number of interceptors needed to cope with it.
Conclusion
The contrasting Iranian and Israeli experiences of the 12 Day War combine to provide an account of the enduring difficulty of defense in contemporary missile conflict. The fragile and outdated Iranian air defense system enabled a shockingly successful Israeli missile defeat strategy that dramatically curtailed the effectiveness of the Iranian missile force. Nevertheless, US and Israeli defenses were stretched thin and vast numbers of interceptors were needed to defend against Iran’s ragged retaliation.
This account augurs poorly for US and allied missile defense efforts against other adversaries, particularly China. Employing a similar missile defeat strategy against China seems infeasible, and defending bases like Guam will require very large numbers of interceptors. If about a quarter of THAAD and SM-3 stockpiles were consumed in less than two weeks of combat against Iran, no doubt a regional conflict against the more advanced People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force would consume a much larger share of those stockpiles. As it will be difficult for interceptor production and expenditure rates to keep up with North Korean and Chinese missile production, investing more in passive defenses is a prudent choice. The Israeli experience during True Promise II showed passive defenses like aircraft shelters, dispersal, quick runway repairs, and larger more flexible airbases are relatively cheap tools to reduce the burden on active defenses.
46 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024.”
47 Decker Eveleth, “IMINT: Iran’s Strike on Nevatim Airbase,” Hors D’Oeuvres of Battle, October 4, 2024, https://horsdoeuvresofbattle.blog/2024/10/04/imint-irans-strike-on-nevatim-airbase/.
About the Author
Sam Lair is a Fellow in the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and a Research Associate on the Open-Source Intelligence Team at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He manages and conducts investigations into nuclear and missile programs using satellite imagery, state and social media, and archival sources. Sam also writes about the relationship between domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, and missile defense technology during the Cold War. He was a member of the Nuclear Scholars Initiative Class of 2025 at the CSIS Project on Nuclear Issues. Sam holds a M.A. in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California and a B.A. in History and Political Science from Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas.